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SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS.

By

Robert Weir. New York: Oxford University Press. 1984. Pp. viii,
292. $27.95.
In April 1982, a Down's syndrome baby starved to death in a
Bloomington, Indiana hospital when his parents refused consent to operate on his blocked esophagus. 1 Court battles and publicity focused
nationwide attention on Bloomington's "Infant Doe," but his fate is
not unique. Each year thousands of newborns are denied life-sustaining treatment - even food and water - because they are mentally
or physically handicapped. Doctors today can save children who once
would have died naturally at birth, but when life-saving treatment sustains a child with severe mental or physical burdens, doctors and parents wonder whether to let nature take its course. The nontreatment
dilemma is one of a society whose scientific development has outgrown
the boundaries of moral consensus. Recently it has become the subject
of ethical, religious, medical, legal, and legislative debate.
Theologian Robert Weir's2 Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped
Newborns is a significant contribution to this debate. Weir surveys the
views of pediatricians, lawyers, and ethicists on selective nontreatment
and then proposes his own model for decisionmaking. The book's
unique strength is its interdisciplinary approach - an approach which
lays bare the complexities professionals and scholars must face when
they peer outside their own disciplines at the broader social context.
Ironically, Weir's proposed model ignores or evades many of these
complexities, and that is the book's major flaw.
Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns surveys medical,
legal, and ethical opinions in the nontreatment debate. In the medical
area, Weir begins by describing the dynamics of the typical NICU
(Newborn Intensive Care Unit) and explaining common birth defects
in lay terms. By informing his readers from the outset of the gravity of
newborn handicaps and the uncertainties of prognosis, Weir equips
them to evaluate scholarly debate with common sense.
Weir goes on to compare the views of seven pediatricians who have
written extensively on the question of selective nontreatment. Though
the physicians surveyed all agree in principle to "do no harm," they
disagree on the meaning of "harm." Physicians Raymond Duff,
1. In re Infant Doe, No. 608204-004A (Monroe County Cir., Apr. 12, 1982) (declaratocy
judgment), affd., Ind. Sup. Ct. No. 4821540 (sealed), cert. denied sub nom. Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983); see generally Note, Withholding Treatment from Defective
Infants: "Infant Doe" Postmortem, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 224 (1983).
2. Robert F. Weir is Professor of Religious Studies at Oklahoma State University, where he
teaches courses on biomedical ethics. He is the editor of ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYINO
(1977) and DEATH IN LITERATURE (1980).
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Anthony Shaw, and John Lorber believe that "do no harm" implies
nontreatment for newborns who lack the prospect of a "minimally acceptable quality of life." Doctors R.B. Zachary and Norman Frost
think that doing no harm involves a detriment-benefit calculus: do not
treat neonates for whom life's detriments outweigh its benefits. In
contrast, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop maintains that doing no
harm means treating all nondying infants, since death is the ultimate
harm. Weir shows that even within the medical profession there is
significant disagreement concerning who should make nontreatment
decisions (physicians or parents) and what criteria they should use.
Weir does a superficial job of pointing out the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the legal response to the selective nontreatment problem. He briefly explores different views on the legal status of neonates,
the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of maintaining life, and the significance of direct killing versus letting die. He
recognizes the gap between the criminal law on the books and in practice: though those withholding treatment may be violating state homicide or neglect laws, no parent or physician has been successfully
prosecuted for withholding medical treatment from a handicapped
newborn. 3 Weir presents the wide-ranging views of legal commentators advocating vigorous prosecution of nontreaters as murderers; 4 retention of the current system of nonenforcement, with the law on the
books as deterrent; 5 interpretation of the current law to allow circumscribed areas of legal nontreatment; 6 and legalization of nonvoluntary
active euthanasia in certain cases. 7
Weir also presents a scathing criticism of the Reagan administration's recent attempts to resolve the legal dispute. Though the book
was written before the most recent Department of Health and Human
Services regulations were released, Weir's criticism of the first set of
"Baby Doe Regs" still applies: even if the new rules are less vague
than the old ones, federal executive intervention and surveillance is
3. Weir points to the 1981 Mueller case (parents and attending physician were charged with
conspiring to commit murder for withholding food from Siamese twin boys, but the charges were
dropped for lack of evidence) and the 1975 Ede/in case (Massachusetts obstetrician's murder
conviction for failing to ventilate an aborted but possibly viable fetus overturned on appeal) as
situations where the gap between legal theory and practice occasionally narrows (p. 101).
4. Horan, Euthanasia as a Form of Medical Management, in DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHA219 (D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1977).

NASIA

5. Burt, Authorizing Death for Anomalous Newborns, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 435,447
(A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).
6. A. HOLDER, LEGAL lssUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADoLESCENT MEDICINE 114 (1977);
Grad, Legal Aspects of Informed Consent, in DECISION MAKING AND THE DEFECTIVE NEWBORN 443 (C. Swinyard ed. 1978); MacMillan, Birth-Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 620 (1978).
7. Morris, Proposed Legislation, in INFANTICIDE AND THE VALUE OF LIFE 221-27 (M. Kohl
ed. 1978).
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not the best way to handle medical care decisions for handicapped
newborns.
Weir's legal analysis is limited, though, by his complete reliance on
secondary sources. Unlike his medical survey, which is grounded in
reality, Weir's legal discussion lacks any reference to the distinctions
courts are actually making and applying. As a result, his characterizations of court decisions are often inaccurate, superficial, or unrealistic.
His suggestion that most courts faced with nontreatment cases have
ordered treatment (p. 266) is misleading - the majority of reported
opinions uphold parental refusal of treatment for handicapped
newborns. 8 His statement that courts have so far protected the best
interests of handicapped children (p. 140) does not explain how judges
know what is best. Weir assumes that courts reach objective best interest determinations without making comparative quality of life projections: an examination of recent court opinions suggests not only
that this characterization is untrue, but also that it may be impossible. 9
Weir is at his best when surveying the attempts of ethicists and
theologians to put together well-reasoned and consistent positions on
selective nontreatment. In an effort to get beyond emotionalism, Weir
presents the advantages and disadvantages of five ethical options:
(1) treat all nondying neonates, 10 (2) terminate the lives of selected
"nonpersons," 11 (3) defer to parental discretion, 12 (4) withhold treatment according to quality of life projections, 13 and (5) withhold treatment not in the child's best interests. 14 While recognizing the intuitive
or practical appeal of these approaches, Weir also points out their vagaries, limitations and inherent subjectivities. Unfortunately, his preference for the "best interests" test leads him to overstate its
advantages and to overlook its inherent problems: Whose objectivity?
How is harm assessed if not relatively? When does the harm outweigh
the benefits?
8. See In re Infant Doe, Ind. Sup. Ct. No. 4821S40 (sealed), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394
(1983) (upholding decision to withhold treatment, food, and water from Down's syndrome infant); Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 68S, ajfd., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63,
4S6 N.E.2d 1186, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. S60 (1983) (upholding decision not to treat infant born
with spina bifida and other complications); In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 1S6 Cal. Rptr.
48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding nontreatment of eleven-year-old Down's Syndrome boy with
a correctible heart defect); see also In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 101S (La. 1982); In re Custody of a
Minor, 38S Mass. 697 (1982).
9. See cases cited at note 8 supra.
10. P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 192 (1978).
11. Tooley, A Defense ofAbortion and Infanticide, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION S1-91 (J.
Feinberg ed. 1973).
12. Fletcher, Choices ofLife or Death in the Care ofDefective Newborns, in SOCIAL RESPON·
SIBILITY: JOURNALISM, LAW, AND MEDICINE 77 (L. Hodges ed. 197S).
13. McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma ofModern Medicine, 229 J. A.M.A. 174
(1974).
14. Engelhardt, Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children, in BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA 18S (M. Kohl ed. 197S).
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In short, Weir recognizes that physicians, lawyers, and ethicists
have been talking past each other on the issue of selective nontreatment. His multidisciplinary approach challenges participants in the
nontreatment debate to develop standards and procedures that are
sensitive to the complexities of individual cases but can be clearly and
consistently applied. Theories must be evaluated in terms of their applicability to actual nontreatment dilemmas. Weir recognizes this
need, and concludes his book with a proposed model for further discussion. But Weir's model suffers from the same problems of vagueness, oversimplification, and rigidity which he warns against in the
preceding chapters of the book.
Weir proposes that the standard for nontreatment decisions be
"best interests of the child." He describes this standard as an objective
balancing test which allows nontreatment only when the harm of
treatment would outweigh the benefits to the child. His analysis is
shallow, though, for in practice, the "best interests" test is as subjective as the "quality of life" projection he condemns. Harm can only be
defined subjectively. The extent of harm is determined by comparing
the handicapped child with a normal child - the quality of life comparison Weir himself criticizes. The harm/benefit balancing is also inherently subjective: to say that at a certain point the harm of
continued existence outweighs the benefit is the same as saying that
the life is not worth living.
Weir first argues that unlike the "quality of life" test, the "best
interests" test focuses solely on the interests of the child. However,
actual applications of this test in court have included considerations of
the family's capabilities and interests 15 - considerations which Weir
himself recognizes as "tragically necessary" in some cases (p. 215).
Weir also argues that the "best interests" test focuses on the infant's
medical prognosis. In reality an infant's handicap may affect his or
her strictly medical prognosis, and, as Weir demonstrates in his medical survey, physicians often incorporate quality of life judgments in
their medical recommendations. Weir's "best interests" test, which
allows but does not admit subjective quality of life comparisons, diverts debate from the fundamental questions of whether or how society should make such comparisons.
Second, Weir labels newborns as "potential persons" with lesser
claims to life than adults. His use of this label to rationalize what the
legal status of fetuses and newborns has been, however, does not answer the question of what their status should be. The concept of
15. See, e.g., Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 456 N.E.2d
1186, cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 560 (1983) (dismissing challenge to nontreatment decision to avoid
subjecting parents to the invasion of privacy and expense of litigation brought by a third party);
In re Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 792 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (earlier decision to withhold treatment from eleven-year-old Down's Syndrome boy may
have been in the family's "combined best interests," but was not in the child's best interest).
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nonpersonhood is no more than post hoc justification of non treatment
(They don't kill persons, do they?). The real question is not what to
call neonates, but whether to treat them. A more helpful way to approach this question might be to think of a continuum of human life
from fertilization to brain death and to ask where on that continuum
nontreatment is justified.
Third, Weir makes a compelling argument that when treatment is
not in the child's best interests there may be no moral difference between actively killing the child (i.e., by injection) and passively letting
the child die. Where nontreatment would result in prolonged suffering
(Le., starvation) a lethal injection is more humane. Weir's argument is
weakened by his suggestion that there is a causational difference between killing and letting die. Not all patients allowed to die do so, 16
but not all attempts to kill are successful either. When death occurs,
the responsibility for it is the same in either case. The fact that death
is marginally more certain from active killing than from passive nontreatment should not be allowed to obscure the similar moral content
of the choices. In addition, Weir suggests that death is only intended
when life-prolonging treatment is withheld against the child's best interests. This analysis confuses intent with justification. Withholding
life-prolonging treatment in the child's best interests intentionally
causes death to mitigate harm. The appropriate argument is not that
the killing is unintentional, but rather, that it is justified.
Fourth, Weir proposes that neonatal treatment decisions be made
on the basis of diagnostic categories of diseases. Weir claims that congenital anomalies can be divided into three groups: (1) untreatable
diseases (treatment is futile), (2) treatable diseases which should not
be treated (treatment is not in the infant's best interests), and (3) treatable diseases which should be treated (treatment is in the infant's best
interests). Weir concludes that this system can be objectively and consistently applied to nontreatment choices. He should know better.
Medical diagnoses and prognoses, as Weir warns in previous chapters, are tentative and complex. A disease like spina bifida spans the
treatability range. Infants suffering from multiple anomalies may fall
outside Weir's black and white categories. To answer, as he does, that
treatment in "gray areas" is optional is to permit subjectivity and inconsistency, to risk maleficence in individual cases, and to leave the
most interesting questions unanswered.
Weir lists examples of diseases which fall within each category, yet
his alignment must change with technological advances. Ironically, he
16. In 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court authorized doctors to remove Karen Ann Quinlan from a respirator despite medical predictions that she could not live without it. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). The comatose woman survived for nine years without the
respirator. Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies 9 Year.s After Coma Decision, N.Y. Times, June 12,
1985, at 1, col. 2.
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lists "hypoplastic left ventricle" as an untreatable disease. In 1984
doctors in Loma Linda, California kept an infant born with that condition alive for a month by replacing her heart with that of a baby
baboon. 17 Rigid adherence to Weir's categorical rules would have denied the infant, known as Baby Fae, even a chance for life. It would
also have frozen medical science, by preventing physicians from ever
learning how to treat what was considered to be an untreatable
disease.
In addition to being overly rigid, Weir's categories are also subjective. Most writers agree that the agony of children suffering from
Lesch Nyhan syndrome (a process of neurological and physiological
deterioration characterized by severe mental deficiency and self-mutilation) should not be prolonged. There is wide disagreement, however, on the treatment of diseases like Down's syndrome and spina
bifida. Weir admits that one basis for distinguishing between categories is the degree of mental ("neurological") deficiency - a subjective
assessment of the projected quality of life.
Finally, Weir does a thorough job of discussing the strengths and
weaknesses of doctors, parents, committees, and courts as nontreatment decisionmakers. Still, his proposed procedure ignores some
practical problems. In Weir's model, parents are the primary decisionmakers. Considering that the parents' choice is heavily influenced
by the physician's prognosis and recommendation, the independence
of their decision is questionable. Furthermore, though Weir advocates
the use of hospital committees, under his proposed procedure, committees will rarely review nontreatment decisions on which doctors
and parents agree. Social workers and nurses rarely raise official appeals, and it is unlikely that people outside the hospitals will know to
object. Weir's decisionmaking process could be alienating, time-consuming, and cumbersome (parents to doctors to committees to courts),
and therefore inappropriate for NICU cases.
Despite the shortcomings of Weir's proposed model and standards,
Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns is recommended
reading for anyone concerned with the nationwide dilemma in the
NICUs. Its pages are rich with medical, legal, ethical, and emotional
complexity. And its very failings challenge readers to suggest a better
way.

11. Baby Girl 'Stable' With Baboon Heart, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 28, 1984, § 1, at 14, col. 1;
Doctors Defend Baboon Heart For Baby, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 29, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 3.

